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 
Abstract— Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) systems 
are being developed to improve spectrum utilization. Most 
of the research on DSA systems assumes that the 
participants involved are honest, cooperative, and that no 
malicious adversaries will attack or exploit the network. 
Some recent research efforts have focused on studying 
security issues in cognitive radios but there are still 
significant security challenges in the implementation of 
DSA systems that have not been addressed.  
In this paper we focus on security issues in DSA. We 
identify various attacks (e.g., DoS attacks, system 
penetration, repudiation, spoofing, authorization violation, 
malware infection, data modification, etc.) and suggest 
various approaches to address them. We show that 
significant security issues exist that should be addressed by 
the research community if DSA is to find its way into 
production systems.  We also show that, in many cases, 
existing approaches to securing IT systems can be applied 
to DSA and identify other DSA specific security challenges 
where additional research will be required. 
 
Index Terms—Dynamic spectrum assignment, cognitive radio, 
security, secondary use. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
DYNAMIC Spectrum Access (DSA) is being proposed as 
a new communication paradigm to address problems of 
inefficient spectrum usage [1] [2]. DSA systems that foster 
secondary use of otherwise idle spectrum can be either 
decentralized (opportunistic), negotiated (such as market-
based secondary use), or based on a regime of license trading. 
The approach taken by the US Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) in [3] epitomizes the opportunistic 
approach.  In this approach, unlicensed users with properly 
equipped radios can use idle spectrum.  The negotiated 
approach assumes that a license holder explicitly permits a 
secondary user to temporarily utilize the spectrum (perhaps 
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via a market) [4].   DSA systems that do not rely on secondary 
use or opportunistic access are those based on spectrum 
trading where a spectrum license assignments are managed in 
a market-based environment [5].   
An important challenge for all of these DSA methods is 
security. Most of the research on the operation of DSA 
systems assumes that the participants are honest, cooperative 
and that no malicious adversaries will attack or exploit the 
network. Although some research has been done on security 
issues related to cognitive radios [6] [7], more challenges 
related to DSA in all its forms that must be understood before 
its widespread adoption.  
With the FCC’s recent white spaces decision [3] 
understanding the security concerns and their mitigation 
strategies is of increasing importance not just to equipment 
manufacturers but also to policymakers and end users.  
Policymakers must ensure that regulations regarding DSA 
systems are consistent with practical approaches, and that end 
users are able to make informed choices about how these 
systems fit into their communication needs.  
In this paper, we will first provide an overview of key 
information security concepts and then discuss the security 
issues related to DSA systems.  In section II we present some 
information security concept preliminaries. Section III 
discusses some vulnerabilities in opportunistic DSA and 
suggests possible approaches that can be used to address them. 
Section IV describes security issues in negotiated DSA 
systems and some useful approaches to remediate them. 
Finally, Section V concludes the paper and discusses possible 
directions for future research. 
II. SECURITY PRELIMINARIES 
Information security consists of methods to protect 
information and information systems resources. The key 
security goals include Confidentiality, Integrity and 
Availability (C/I/A).  
 Confidentiality means ensuring that only authorized 
people can access a piece of information or resource; 
sometimes even the existence of the information or 
resource needs to be hidden from unauthorized entities.  
 Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and correctness of 
information and resources – and is commonly referred to 
as data integrity and origin integrity [8]. Data integrity 
refers to how trustworthy or correct a piece of information 
is. It is, often simplified as ensuring authorized 
modification; however, integrity of information may be 
violated also by authorized entities – hence both 
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preventive and detective/reactive approaches are needed 
to ensure data integrity. Origin integrity, often known as 
authentication, on the other hand, refers to validating that 
an entity is who it claims to be.  
 Availability refers to ensuring that authorized entities 
have timely access to information and resources.  
 
The information security field focuses on ensuring that all 
these key security goals are met with regard to information 
that is in storage, being transmitted or being processed. In 
addition these, issues such as accountability, and non-
repudiation are crucial security issues. Accountability refers to 
ensuring that each activity can be uniquely traced back to the 
entity which carried it out. Non-repudiation refers to ensuring 
that an entity cannot deny his actions. Numerous threats and 
attacks have been identified in information security field that 
target these protection goals, some of which are listed in Table 
I. 
TABLE I 
THREATS AND THEIR C/I/A VIOLATIONS 
 
Threats 
 
C/I/A violations 
Eavesdropping: The unauthorized interception 
of information 
Confidentiality  
Data modification or alternation: The 
unauthorized modification of information  
Integrity  
Denial of Service (DoS): A long-term inhibition 
of service at source or destination 
Availability  
Spoofing or Masquerading: Impersonation of 
one entity by another 
Integrity  
Repudiation: An entity falsely claims that it did 
not carry out an activity. 
Integrity  
III. SECURITY ISSUES IN OPPORTUNISTIC DSA 
Cognitive Radios (CRs) are an enabling technology for 
opportunistic DSA. CRs discover white spaces or holes in 
spectrum and opportunistically utilize them without causing 
interference to primary users [9]. More specifically, Haykin 
[10] defined CR to be a software-based radio that can sense, 
learn, adapt and react based on the environment condition. 
Thus, developing different reasoning and learning algorithms 
that lead to optimal operation of cognitive radio in a variety of 
different situations is one of the important goals of the 
research community.  
Operationally, CRs and CR networks must perform the 
following functions: 
 Spectrum sensing: detecting spectrum holes. 
 Spectrum mobility: maintaining seamless 
communication during the transition to better spectrum. 
 Spectrum management: selecting the best available 
channels. 
 Spectrum sharing: coexisting with other secondary 
users in one channel. 
From the perspective of security, there is little that is unique 
to cognitive radios from the perspective of confidentiality and 
integrity1.  Thus, we focus our attention on availability.   
 
1 Confidentiality attacks are similar to eavesdropping attacks on any radio 
system and can therefore be addressed by existing techniques for ensuring 
confidentiality, such as integrity.  The same is true for integrity once a 
communication has been established between cognitive radios. 
It is important to distinguish the context.  There are two 
types of cognitive networks [11]: centralized (infrastructure-
based) and distributed (ad-hoc) cognitive radio networks. In 
centralized cognitive radio networks, the secondary users are 
managed by secondary base stations, all of which could be 
connected through a wire line network. In centralized, 
infrastructure-based networks, all of the secondary users are 
synchronized with the base stations, which are also 
responsible for managing secondary users. Furthermore, the 
secondary users normally cooperate in spectrum sensing and 
sharing tasks; although non-cooperative centralized cognitive 
radio networks may also exist.  
In distributed cognitive radio networks, secondary users use 
ad-hoc communication and mesh networking concepts. Each 
set of secondary users who are in range of each other can 
exchange information directly. The secondary users who are 
not within the communication range of each other can 
exchange information by relaying through other nodes in the 
network. Secondary users in distributed cognitive radio 
networks are responsible for determining their transmit power, 
spectrum band, etc., in accordance with spectrum regulations.  
In distributed cognitive radio networks, cooperation 
between all the secondary users may occur via mechanisms 
such as control channels, etiquette rules or explicit message 
exchange. Secondary users in these networks may also use a 
non-cooperative approach, in which each secondary user 
optimizes locally and may compete with others in doing so. 
Security issues could be a serious roadblock to a successful 
adoption of this new technology in production systems. In this 
section, we present various security issues in opportunistic 
DSA systems. We will address attacks on each of the major 
functional areas described above. 
A. Attacks on Spectrum Sensing and Sharing 
Attacks on spectrum sensing and sharing are most often 
DoS attacks (see Table I). In [7], Jakimoski et al. show that the 
majority of CR-based DSA implementations are unable to 
offer both minimal disruption of the primary users and 
efficient utilization of the vacant spectrum bands when a 
malicious adversary is introduced. They analyze two different 
topologies: a centralized secondary network (infrastructure-
based cognitive network) and a distributed secondary network 
(ad-hoc based cognitive network) using a channel evacuation 
protocol. In the centralized secondary network, they augment 
a spectrum pooling system with a boosting protocol to detect 
idle spectrum and inform other secondary users about it [7] 
[12] [13]. Attackers can spoof the secondary users to use 
spectrum bands that are not idle, and therefore disrupt the 
services of the primary network, or make other secondary 
users evacuate the spectrum and inhibit their usage of the idle 
bands.  
Furthermore, in both centralized and distributed 
opportunistic DSA systems, it is possible to have more than 
one secondary network. Hence, the effects of the attack 
become even worse and transmission from malicious users in 
one network can also cause disruption of service to the 
primary and secondary users of the other networks, this type 
of attack is referred to as an overlapping secondary user attack 
[11].  Researchers have proposed several strategies to mitigate 
these attacks: 
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 Modifying the modulation scheme:  Using spread 
spectrum techniques such as frequency hopping [14] and 
direct-sequence spread spectrum [15], make it more 
difficult for attackers to launch effective DoS attacks, 
although they may be able to degrade service quality. 
 Detection and prevention of attacks using passively 
obtained data, such as observing the primary user’s 
location and signal characteristics [9]. 
 Using authentication and trust models. In [16], Wang et 
al. propose a malicious user detection algorithm that 
calculates the suspicion level of secondary users based on 
their past reports and then based on that calculates trust 
and consistency values to eliminate the malicious users’ 
influence on the primary user detection results. They 
effectively differentiate between malicious and honest 
secondary users based on the proposed trust value 
indicator. 
B. Attacks on Spectrum Mobility (The handoff process) 
The main objective of spectrum mobility function is to 
ensure seamless communications when a CR vacates a 
channel and moves to a new channel. Normally, a CR will 
vacate the current band if it is no longer available, when the 
quality degrades, or when the user moves from one place to 
another. In order to maintain the communication path, the CR 
needs to select a new appropriate spectrum band, and move to 
it immediately. The spectrum handoff process begins with a 
CR vacating the current spectrum band and ends when the CR 
moves to the new band [1]. 
A failed handoff may require a long recovery time and can 
cause upper layer protocols to fail, which affects availability. 
There are several possibilities in which the handoff process 
might be disrupted. In one kind of disruption, an attacker can 
compel a CR to vacate the current band by masquerading as 
the primary user (Primary user emulation) [17]. In a primary 
user emulation attack, an attacker sends primary-user-like 
signals during the spectrum sensing period and thus jams the 
secondary user. To mitigate this kind of attack, a secondary 
user can randomly hop over multiple channels. This opens a 
tradeoff between choosing good channels and evading an 
attacker’s jamming when different channels have different 
qualities (e.g. probabilities of being idle, propagation 
characteristics, etc.). The interaction between the secondary 
user and the attacker has been called a dogfight in spectrum 
due to the dynamics of pursuit and evasion [18]. In [18], Li et 
al. analyzed one-stage and multi-stage cases by numerical 
simulation results and they showed that the performance of a 
secondary user was improved when the number of channels 
was increased or the channel state certainty was reduced.  
Another type of disruption occurs when the attacker jams 
the network to increase the time needed to select a new 
available band or cause a communication failure [19]. 
Mitigation requires broadening the operating range of the CR, 
which increases costs and energy consumption.   
Finally, if an attacker can take control of the common 
control channel that some CRs use [20], s/he can change the 
key parameters of the available band or interfere with primary 
users. Hence, this kind of attack prevents spectrum mobility. 
Mitigating this attack requires securing the control channel 
using standard authentication, authorization, and auditing 
(AAA) techniques. 
C. Attacks on Spectrum Management  
CRs detect idle spectrum bands for communication using 
spectrum sensing. Their spectrum management function will 
then select the most appropriate bands considering the QoS 
demands of the users. In [1], the functions of spectrum 
management are classified as spectrum analysis and spectrum 
decision. Spectrum analysis provides the characterization of 
different spectrum bands and the spectrum decision process 
selects the appropriate spectrum band for the current 
transmission by considering the QoS requirements and the 
spectrum characteristics.  
Spectrum sensing data falsification attacks are a serious 
threat to the spectrum analysis process and can impact the 
results of spectrum decision function, which can lead to 
reduced system performance. In this kind of attack, a 
malicious user sends false local spectrum sensing results to a 
data collector in a cooperative sensing system. The results are 
then propagated to other CRs in the system, which may lead to 
a suboptimal spectrum use decision resulting in degraded 
system performance.  
The attacks in these kinds of systems are even worse than 
for independent CRs because it will affect other base stations 
or users in the network, causing the whole system to 
misbehave [21]. For example, in an IEEE 802.22 CR network, 
if the adversary mimics a television signal, then the station 
detecting this signal will propagate this observation to every 
station in the network causing all secondary users to evacuate 
the spectrum. In [22], Frangoudis et al. analyzed incentives for 
truthful distributed (cooperative) spectrum sensing and 
reporting relevant attacks. As a solution for spectrum sensing 
data falsification attacks, they offer an efficient filtering 
scheme by using information (spatial and temporal) from 
multiple sources to filter out false reports by applying simple 
majority or voting rules. As a result, collected reports can 
easily detect “odd” spectrum measurements. However, they do 
not consider the effect of hidden nodes on this strategy. If 
majority of the voting stations are hidden nodes, a false 
negative could still result.  
This research suggests that a variant on this kind of attack 
might be an opportunistic CR in a cooperative system that 
self-optimizes. That is, a radio in a cooperative sensing system 
may decide to send out false information that would cause 
other radios in the network to change their spectrum use 
behavior, allowing the selfish radio to improve its own 
communications channel. Such an attack could avoid AAA 
techniques that might filter out intruders.  A voting system as 
described above may be effective in isolating selfish nodes, 
especially if a punishment strategy is adopted by the network. 
D. Attacks against the Learning Engine 
CRs are built to respond to their environment, so some may 
employ artificial intelligence (AI) techniques in their decision 
making. Thus, it is important to consider attacks that focus on 
exploiting these techniques, which may use learning engines 
to react to their environment based on past and present 
information. For example, a reasonable strategy for attacks on 
spectrum sensing would be to distort the information used by 
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the algorithms that separate false from correct sensing results. 
Such algorithms would almost certainly need to consider 
historical sensing results. If a patient attacker were to 
persistently feed the intelligent CR with false results, the false 
results would become part of the “known” historical facts, 
which would be persistent over time. The patient attacker 
would then achieve a rather long lasting DoS attack. Such an 
attack worsens when we have a cooperative network since the 
fallacious information (and belief network) will propagate 
through the network and thus becomes even more persistent 
over time.  
Mitigation of these kinds of attacks is rather challenging.  
One approach is to make the task of the patient attacker more 
difficult by being more critical of the accepted information 
and another is to decrease the persistence of beliefs (that is, to 
allow only short term results) [7]. Yet another approach is to 
define trust metrics [21] and letting radios reason about the 
trustworthiness of their neighbors. All of these mitigation 
strategies limit the effectiveness of the AI in the CR. 
Another kind of attack on the learning engine requires an 
attacker to tamper with the system and modify its policies. For 
instance, a system may have a policy to evacuate the spectrum 
whenever it detects the primary user’s existence. If an attacker 
can gain access to the policy engine, s/he can program the 
radio to “exploit” instead of “evacuate” the channel. Hence, 
we need tamper proof radios to address this issue.  
E. Attacks on Spectrum Sharing 
The vulnerabilities described above require physical layer 
attacks. Opportunistic CRs require a MAC layer to enforce the 
sharing of spectrum holes among several users.  He and 
Mitchell [23] catalog the security vulnerabilities of 802.11i.  It 
is reasonable to assume that many of the vulnerabilities and 
mitigation strategies suggested by the authors would have to 
be addressed in the MAC for opportunistic CRs as well.  Since 
these security challenges are not specific to CRs but rather to 
MAC layers in general, we will not address them in this paper.   
 Most of the secondary users in CR networks are mobile and 
have limited resources and processing power. Hence, 
providing secure cognitive radio capability in real-time is a 
challenging task. In doing so, light weight security protocols 
are required especially for power/resource constraint 
environments [11]. 
   Furthermore, as the number of opportunistic users in 
opportunistic DSA increases, the networks become more 
vulnerable to the aforementioned attacks.  Thus, it becomes 
increasingly important that secure approaches be applied. This 
kind of MAC-based opportunism was examined by Sandvig 
[24], who showed that system availability existed even in such 
a rivalrous environment. 
IV. SECURITY IN NEGOTIATED (COOPERATIVE) DSA 
Opportunistic DSA systems are characterized by the 
absence of coordination between the primary and secondary 
user.  If a primary user (i.e., a license holder) must make 
investments to ensure the security of their system to mitigate 
risks of opportunistic use of their spectrum, then we may 
expect them to make their channels appear busy (by sending 
null characters, for example) if the cost of transmitting these 
characters is less than the required security investment.   
If we assume that secondary spectrum sharing is the result 
of an explicit agreement between the primary and the 
secondary user, then the operational environment changes, as 
do the security concerns. In negotiated DSA, we could expect 
to see more spectrums available for sharing. Furthermore, 
because many of the sophisticated functions of cognitive 
radios are not required, we could imagine that negotiated 
systems can use cheaper, more energy efficient and (possibly) 
more secure software radios. 
In considering the security aspects of negotiated DSA, it is 
also important to be mindful that a primary user may have 
commitments to its (regular) users.  These commitments may 
include a Service Level Agreement (SLA) that defines 
monetary penalties for non-performance. 
The threats outlined in Table I apply in negotiated DSA 
albeit with some differences because these systems are rooted 
in commerce. Eavesdropping and data modification attacks are 
no different in negotiated and opportunistic DSA so we will 
not discuss them further. In negotiated DSA, it is useful to 
distinguish monetary or financial threats from technical ones. 
  Because of the potentially commercial nature of negotiated 
DSA, some of the threats involve the terms and conditions of 
contracts. These can include price and performance 
requirements (such as an SLA). A primary user may choose to 
incur the penalty if a sufficiently attractive alternative arises. 
A secondary user may choose to renegotiate (or even 
repudiate) an agreement if the demand motivating the 
spectrum request unexpectedly evaporates. In the former case, 
the secondary user will be denied service whilst in the latter 
case the primary user will be denied revenue. Thus, it can be 
classified as a commercial threat. In cases involving 
renegotiation, no technical remedies exist.   
However, repudiation, DoS and spoofing deserve some 
attention: 
 Repudiation – Repudiation may take on an additional 
meaning in negotiated DSA. A primary or secondary user 
may choose to deny the existence of a negotiated contract.   
 Denial of service – A malicious third party may use a 
variety of techniques to prevent primary or secondary 
users from achieving their communications or systems 
goals. In negotiated DSA, DoS attacks can have economic 
consequences because of penalties that might be 
associated with service level agreements (SLAs). While 
this may be dealt with in contracts, it may also be 
necessary to implement technical mechanisms to 
distinguish externally and internally sourced events. 
 Spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks can be used by 
malicious third parties for eavesdropping, data 
modification, or creating the appearance of repudiation.   
Regardless of the mechanisms used to achieve the agreement 
(i.e., brokers, markets, etc.) the following functions must 
occur for negotiated DSA: 
 Primary and secondary users must find each other 
(Advertisement).  Primary users may announce the 
availability of spectrum through an advertisement of some 
kind, and secondary users must respond to one or more 
advertisements. 
 5
 An agreement must be negotiated.  The terms of this 
agreement may include spectrum boundaries, 
geographical boundaries, start and end times, price, 
penalties for failure to perform, etc. 
 Sharing and monitoring. The sharing occurs under the 
terms of the contract.  One or both parties may choose to 
monitor the performance of the other party to ensure 
compliance. 
 Settlement at the end of the sharing episode. When 
sharing is complete, settlement procedures may be 
necessary to complete the terms of the contract.  
Settlement may include payment of service fees and 
penalties, updating trust models, publicizing the terms of 
sharing, etc. 
We organize the remainder of this section around the four 
functions outlined above plus some additional comments. 
A. Advertisement 
Before a contract can be established, the primary and 
secondary users must first find each other. This can be 
achieved in a number of ways, including: 
 Registering in a (hypothetical) secondary use market as 
a primary or secondary user 
 Registering with a broker 
 Opening or responding to a directory listing 
Since secondary use is a contractual outcome, primary and 
secondary users must be able to authenticate the legitimacy of 
their counterpart to avert subsequent spoofing or man-in-the-
middle attacks. While repudiation is not a concern at this stage 
because no contract has yet been made, DoS attacks are 
possible if registries are overwhelmed with requests.   
B. Negotiation 
Once a secondary user has identified a potential primary 
user, a negotiation must occur on the parameters of the 
secondary use. This can involve specifying the amount of 
bandwidth required in a particular frequency band, the 
geographical boundaries over which this secondary use can 
take place, the start and end time of the secondary use, the fees 
paid by the secondary user to the primary user, SLAs that may 
specify the amount of noise power permitted in the time-
space-frequency dimension outlined above, penalties for 
violating the SLA, etc.   
A threat to this operational phase is causing the negotiation 
overhead to increase.  Such an increase can come as a function 
of time or resources expended.  As such, it can be a form of 
DoS attack.  The form of this threat varies based on the 
mechanics of the negotiations. 
In bilateral negotiations, increased negotiation overhead can 
occur if many special considerations are added or if 
negotiations are opened with no intent to conclude an 
agreement. This is a form of DoS because it consumes 
resources of primary users and may lock up spectrum 
resources during the negotiations that might be used by other 
spectrum users. 
Mitigation strategies for this kind of attack include building 
trust models and authentication. In trust based approach, 
negotiations may be rejected if the trust levels are not 
sufficiently high. Trust levels are incremented upon successful 
negotiations and decremented upon unsuccessful ones.  Thus, 
they are historical and not current representations of behavior.  
Thus, a patient malicious user could build a high trust level 
that could be leveraged in future for a DoS attack of this kind. 
There exist several trust negotiation approaches in the 
literature (e.g., those reviewed in [25]) that address trust 
negotiation in a slightly different context. Such techniques 
have explored trust computation based on reputation, 
recommendation and other factors such as risk, and cost [25]. 
These may be adopted to build a trust based negotiation 
approach for cooperative DSA. 
C. Sharing and Monitoring 
After an agreement has been concluded, spectrum sharing 
begins at the time specified in the agreement. Primary users do 
not transmit on the spectrum during the specified time period 
and the geographic area while secondary users do.  During this 
phase, both primary and secondary users may choose to 
monitor the behavior of the other party to the agreement to 
ensure that SLA terms (if any) are satisfied.   
During this phase, a malicious third party, who may have 
discovered the details of the agreement through 
eavesdropping, may, masquerading as the primary user, 
transmit in the secondary users’ spectrum. If the channel is 
monitored, it would appear to be a repudiation of the contract 
by the primary user to the secondary user and would also be a 
DoS for the secondary user.  Arbitration may be necessary to 
resolve this during the settlement phase, or a “fingerprinting” 
approach to distinguish primary users from third parties 
masquerading as the primary user.   
A malicious third party could also engage in DoS by 
jamming the spectrum during the contract period. Unlike 
opportunistic secondary use, where the secondary user can 
relatively easily utilize frequency hopping to avoid the 
jammed band, the secondary user is helpless if the negotiated 
contract specifies the use of a specific channel. Mitigating this 
kind of attack would require a contract that makes a set of 
channels available over which the secondary user can 
frequency hop. This raises the cost of negotiating over a 
simple secondary sharing contract since the contract is more 
complex 
D. Settlement 
After the secondary use period is concluded, the contract is 
closed and the primary and secondary users settle.  This may 
include monetary payments for spectrum usage rights and/or 
penalties for failing to satisfy the terms of the SLA. The 
settlement phase is vulnerable to third parties who would seek 
to capture the revenue flows and/or influencing the trust levels 
of the primary and secondary users.   
Capturing the revenue flows is an important concern in 
negotiated secondary use DSA.  The attacks and mitigation are 
similar to those that have been developed for electronic 
commerce [26] there is little that is specific to DSA. 
If the system uses a trust-based approach, a malicious 
attacker may seek to influence the trust levels of the primary 
and secondary users. The motivation for this is manifold and 
may involve influencing the prices for secondary use or the 
amount of available spectrum in the future. Applying AAA 
techniques to the trust reporting can mitigate some of these 
risks.  
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E. Additional comments 
While not a security issue with negotiated DSA, service theft 
is a security issue of some importance to commercial 
operators.  A good example of poor security practices leading 
to service theft can be seen in early cellular systems.  In these 
systems, electronic serial numbers (ESNs) and Mobile 
Identification Numbers (MINs) were transmitted as plain text 
and were subsequently captured and programmed into rogue 
phones [27].  Subsequent mobile systems have implemented 
stronger communication security technologies. 
V. SECURITY IN SPECTRUM TRADING BASED DSA 
In a spectrum trading market, the market participants must 
register with the spectrum exchange or a broker to participate 
in the market. Thus, by not having opportunistic secondary use 
and using a user/identity registration mechanism, many 
security problems are avoided. However, vulnerabilities in the 
trading protocol may result in incorrect information 
submission at the time a trade is being made and could 
seriously impact market behavior. For example, consider a 
replay attack, where a malicious node replicates the messages 
to announce a market participant’s willingness to sell or buy 
spectrum.  If it is not detected, the behavior of the market and 
the liabilities of the market participant would be affected. 
Also, the presences of malicious nodes that generate 
interference within the set of tradable frequencies in a given 
region are a key security issue. The generated interference 
would diminish the value of spectrum but malicious nodes 
could be detectable by collaborative methods among the 
entities trading spectrum in a region thus reducing the effect of 
the attack. In the extreme, it could affect the availability of the 
communications channel In general, as with negotiated 
secondary use; spectrum trading DSA markets are susceptible 
to spoofing and DoS attacks. 
VI. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we have presented an overview of the security 
issues in DSA environments. Most of the recently proposed 
implementations for DSA networks assume that the 
participants involved in the protocols are cooperative and that 
there are no malicious adversaries that want to attack the 
network. Hence, most of the proposed solutions are vulnerable 
to several attacks on the primary and secondary user's 
networks.  
With the FCC’s recent, “White Spaces” decision, 
understanding the security concerns and approaches to address 
them is of increasing importance not just to equipment 
manufacturers but also to policymakers and end users. 
Policymakers must ensure that regulations regarding DSA 
systems are consistent with practical approaches, and that end 
users must be able to make informed choices about how these 
systems fit into their mix of communication technologies. 
   Convincing spectrum owners to implement security in a 
negotiated DSA environment should be possible since the 
service providers are being compensated for the service 
provided.  Adoption of secure negotiated DSA techniques 
would generate competition among providers as they can offer 
attractive, secure products via competitive pricing. This option 
is a more “business friendly” approach than the simple 
opportunistic DSA in which, though the services are free, they 
are not regulated or guaranteed to be secure. 
A key future work is to design protocols for secure 
implementations of negotiated DSA and opportunistic DSA 
network functions. Future research must be focused on 
vulnerabilities and remediation of specific systems and 
protocols.   
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